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PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE CLAIMANTS UNDER MILLER ACT
PAYMENT BONDS
PAUL H. GANTT,* ROBERT D. WALLICK " AND JAMES M. PROCTOR***
INTRODUCTION
The Miller Act' requires that prime contractors on most U. S. Gov-
ernment construction contracts2 furnish (1) performance bonds (as-
suring the Government against failure of the prime contractor to com-
plete construction work), and (2) payment bonds (to assure payment
to persons supplying labor and materials in the course of performance
of the contract), in prescribed amounts.3 In this article, the authors will
focus their attention only upon the payment aspects of the Act.
4
At first blush, the Act and its provisions dealing with the payment
bond, appear to be a model of simplicity. But it should not come as a
surprise, especially to those engaged in the tough, demanding and com-
petitive business of the construction industry, and their advisors. to
learn that the Miller Act requirements for payment bonds could match
* Chairman, Board of Contract Appeals, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; Chairman,
Council on Government Contracts, Federal Bar Association.
# B.S. 1948, BS. 1949, Lehigh University; LL.B. 1955, George Washington University.
Certified Public Accountant. Member of the District of Columbia and Maryland bar
associations.
* ** A.B., Princeton University, 1959; J.D., Georgetown University, 1966. Member of
the District of Columbia and Maryland bars.
The opinions of the authors do not represent those of the U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission or of the Federal Bar Association. The advice and cooperation of Kahl
K. Spriggs, Esq., is greatly appreciated by the authors.
1. 40 U.S.C. 5 270a-270e (1958).
2. The Miller Act applies to advertised as well as to negotiated contracts. 40 U.S.C.
S 270e (1958) permits the waiver of the provisions of the Act by the Secretary of
Defense as to certain contracts with the Armed Forces. The Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Defense has issued a general waiver of bond requirements in all cost-reimburse-
ment type contracts. ASPR 10-103.3.
S. ASPR 10-103 and FPR 1-10.104.1, 1-10.105.1 fix the penal sum at 50 per cent of the
contract price where such price does not exceed $1,000,000; 40 per cent where the
contract price is between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000; and a flat $2,500,000 where the
contract price exceeds $5,000,000. Additional bonding is required where contract modi-
fications result in an increase in the contract price so that the total payment bond
protection amounts to 50 per cent of the revised contract price.
4. The authors leave to further research such problems as those arising under the
Capehart Act; and the cumbersome problem of the division of the penal sum of the
bond between laborers and materialmen, banks and sureties.
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most other provisions of the United States Code in terms of the extent
of litigation5 per statute word. The authors estimate that more than
thirty thousand cases have been litigated under the Miller Act since
its enactment in 1935. The effect of the Miller Act on the economy
was described in 1963 as follows:
The full impact of the Act on our economy is illustrated by the
fact that over one-fifth of all the construction surety bonds writ-
ten in the United States are Miller Act bonds and corporate sure-
ties pay an average in excess of $250,000 a week in settlement of
Miller Act claims. 6
The Payment Bond and Its Problems
The payment bond required by the Act is, in effect, a substitute for
the protection afforded contractors on private construction projects by
a mechanics lien, a security device not available against the Government
because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The federal payment
bond has its counterparts in essentially all construction contracts let by
state and local governments today. All such bonds guarantee payment
to persons supplying labor and materials for the job, provided they
satisfy and comply with the requirements of the Act.
The problems essentially are ones of definition, coverage, notice and
jurisdiction, with some interesting recent developments concerning the
import of the standard federal clauses, such as the one governing "dis-
putes," upon the prime-subcontractor relationship. Before discussing
those problems, a general recount of the history of the Act should be
helpful. 7
5. The following table of statistics has been compiled from the [1965] [1966] and
[1967J AtNuAL REPORTS oF nm DIRECTOR OF Tm ADmiNsTRA AVE OFFICE OF ma
UNTED STATES COURTS.
Miller Act Litigation
U. S. District Courts U. S. Courts of Appeals
Fiscal Year 1967 1158 61
Fiscal Year 1966 1281 37
Fiscal Year 1965 1173 41
6. Lester, The ABC's of the Miller Act, [1963] NEGL. & Comp. L. 250, 251 (ABA
Section of Insurance Proceedings).
7. For general treatments for the Miller Act payment bond, see also Burgess, A
Com mentary on the Miller Act, 42 Bosr. L. REv. 282 (1962); Byrne and Costello, The
Evolution of Coverage Under the Miller Act, 28 FORD. L. Rav. 287 (1959); Easterwood,
Miller Act Problems, 16 Fam. B.J. 264 (1956); Lester, supra note 6; Stickells, Bonds of
Contractors on Federal Public Works-The Miller Act, 36 Bosr. L. Ryv. 499 (1956);
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Historical Background and Purpose of the Act
The initial attempt by Congress to provide persons dealing with prime
contractors on federal construction projects with a measure of financial
protection culminated in the passage of the Heard Act in 1894.8 That
Act required prime contractors to provide a single penal bond which
served as both the performance and the payment bond.
The chief flaws of the Heard Act proved to be (1) delay, since no
recovery could be had until all claims had matured and could be joined
in only one proceeding; and (2) inadequacy, since the claim of the
Government on the performance section of the bond took precedence
over the rights of private claimants.9 The latter could not bring an
action until the whole project was completed, which might be long
after their own portion of the work was done. Further, a claimant
might have to await the outcome of what often was complex multi-
party litigation, at the end of which he might find that only a fraction
of the total fund created by the bond was available to private claimants.
MILLER ACT
Those (and other) problems led to the passage of the Miller Act in
1935. It separated the payment bond from the performance bond, mak-
ing the surety liable for the full amount of its obligation under both.10
The Miller Act gave each claimant a separate cause of action under the
payment bond, which could be enforced shortly after default without
need for joining in other claimants.
The Miller Act, with certain important, but essentially technical
amendments in the intervening years,:" is still with us. The Act has
been recognized consistently by the courts as being "highly remedial
in nature" and has in practice been given a very liberal interpretation
Wallick and Stafford, The Miller Act: Enforcement of the Payment Bond, 29 LAW &
CoNT-Mp. PRoB. 514 (1964).
8. Act of August 13, 1894, ch. 280, § 1, 28 Star. 278 (1894).
9. This was the case immediately before 1935, due to an amendment to the Heard
Act in 105. Act of February 24, 1905, ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811 (1905). See United States
ex rel. Caldwell Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Texas Constr. Co., 224 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.
1955).
10. American Casualty Co. v. Brezina Constr. Co, 295 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1961);
Glen Falls Indemnity Co. v. United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 229
F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Kalady
Constr. Co., 277 F. Supp. 1017 (ND. IM. 1964).
11. As amended, Aug. 4, 1959, PuB. L. 86-135, 73 STAT. 279; June 3, 1955, c. 129, 69
STAT. 83.
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in favor of diligent claimants. An early Supreme Court case declared
that the Act "should be liberally construed in aid of the public object-
security to those who contribute labor or material for public works." 12
Apart from the specific differences between the Miller Act and the
Heard Act, similarities in wording and purpose permit the two acts
to be interpreted largely hi pari materia.13
PROJECTS COVERED
With exception for foreign and military work, where the Act may be
waived, 14 the Miller Act requires bonds on contracts ". . . for the con-
struction, alteration or repair of any public building or public work of
the United States .. ." 15
This raises an immediate question of definition: What is a "public
work of the United States?" It also has raised the more subtle question
as to the legal effect of issuing the bond, if it later develops that the
project is not such a public work.
Typically the question is raised by a prime contractor or his surety
seeking to avoid, in effect, the entire bond obligation by claiming that
the project is not a "public work." This caused the courts to construe
the term "public work" broadly to prevent avoidance of the bond
obligation, since the fact that the bond was voluntarily entered at the
outset of the project creates "strong equities" in favor of claimants. 6
The question, however, may also be raised where the prime contractor
or his surety seeks the benefit of terms in the bond which are more
restrictive upon the claimant than the terms of the Miller Act. Thus,
in a recent case, liability was defeated by proof that notice given by a
claimant, which would have been sufficient under a Miller Act bond,
was not adequate because the project was not a "public work" and
therefore fell outside the provisions of the Act.17
12. Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. United States ex rel. Powell, 302 U.S. 442,
444 (1938); accord, United States ex rel. Bruce Co. v. Fraser Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 1
(D. Ark. 1949). (The Miller Act is named for John E. Miller, a Congressman who
later became a District Judge and wrote the opinion in that case.)
13. See United States ex rel. Calvin Tompkins Co. v. Clifford E. MacEvoy Co., 137
F.2d 565 (3d Cir. 1943); In re Flotation Systems, 65 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Calif. 1946).
14. 40 U.S.C. § 270a(b), 270(e) (1958).
15. 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1958).
16. United States ex rel. Noland Co. v. Irwin, 316 U.S. 23 (1947).
17. United States ex rel. Miles Lumber Co. v. Harrison & Grimshaw Constr. Co., 305
F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1962). This case involved a bond given for a military housing
project under the Capehart Act. See Notes, 111 PA. L. REv. 1014 (1963); 49 VA. L.
REv. 174 (1963).
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The courts, in such cases, have often been called upon to define the
term "public works." They have uniformly held that it is not essential
that title to the property be in the United States. The earlier Heard
Act applied to "work done on property of the United States, . . . and
all fixed works constructed for the public use at the expense of the
United States." 18 The congressional reports relating to the Miller Act
also reveal the broad intent to include "any projects of the character
heretofore constructed or carried on either directly by public authority
or with public aid to serve the interests of the public." 19
Accordingly, it was held in an early case that construction of a library
for Howard University, which had been established by Act of Con-
gress, but was a private institution, was a "public work." 20 In that case,
Congress had appropriated the money for the project. The Court held
that the library "served the interests of the public."
However, the question of public versus private ownership apparently
can be important in the case of work on a project of less obvious general
public purpose than a library. It has been held that a military housing
project under the Capehart Act was not a "public work" on the ground,
inter alia, that "the mere possibility that property will later be owned
by the United States" does not render it immune from statutory liens.
21
We know of no decision to date involving the question of whether
the existence of federal financial assistance to state and local projects
such as hospitals and highways is sufficient to bring them within the
coverage of the Miller Act. One reason for lack of controversy in this
area is that payment bonds on state projects are already required by the
laws of most, if not all, of the states. However, an argument in favor
of such coverage could be made in situations where the federal contri-
bution is significant.
Contracts to furnish personal property to the Government are not
covered where the manufacture of the goods is at the risk of the builder
and the goods are owned by him all the time they are being built.22
18. Peterson v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 119 F.2d 145, 147 (6th Cir. 1941).
19. This is the language of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Act of June 16,
1933, ch. 90, 48 Star. 195 (1933). The legislative history of the Miller Act indicates
that it was intended to cover projects under that Act. See United States ex rel. Noland
Co. v. Irwin, 316 U.S. 23, 29 (1942).
20. United States ex rel. Noland Co. v. Irwin, 316 US. 23, 29 (1942).
21. United States ex rel. Miles Lumber Co. v. Harrison & Grimshaw Constr. Co.,
305 F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1962).
22. United States ex rel. Mengel Body Co. v. Metropolitan Body Co., 79 F.2d 177,
178 (2d Cir. 1935).
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In such a case, the work does not become "public" until after com-
pletion.
ITEMS COVERED GENERALLY
Labor and Materialss3
The items covered by the Miller Act are: "... labor or material
[furnished] in the prosecution of the work provided for in ... [the]
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished ... ." 24 Of
course, any labor or material indispensable to the work contracted to
bo done is included. 2 Litigation has been plentiful, however, in cases
(1) where it is claimed that an expenditure made by a claimant should
not properly be charged to the job because it was capital in nature;
(2) where it is claimed that the labor or material was not used "in the
prosecution of the work provided for," either because it was diverted
from such use altogether or because the work performed was not within
the plans and specifications; or (3) where there is a dispute about the
amount of compensation due for labor or material, if for some reason
it cannot be determined from the express language of the contract.
Expense vs. Capital Expenditure
An obligation for an item capital in nature with a significant useful
life beyond the project in question normally is not covered by the Miller
Act payment bond. The test as to whether an obligation is for an un-
allowable capital item generally has been whether or not it is "substan-
tially consumed" during the current job, 6 but this is probably a sub-
jective test. Thus, it has also been held that a reasonable expectation
by the supplier that an item will be substantially consumed will entitle
him to recovery, whether it is, in fact, so consumed or not.27
As to what constitutes susbtantial consumption, there are no clear
23. See generally Park, What Constitutes Labor and Material in a Labor and Material
Bond, 16 INS. CSL. J. 14 (1949).
24. 40 U.S.C. S 270b(a) (1958).
25. United States ex rel. Watsabaugh Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co, 26 F. Supp. 681
(D. Mont. 1938).
26. United States ex rel. Chemetron Corp. v. George A. Fuller Co., 250 F. Supp.
649 (D. Mont. 1966).
27. Boyd Callan, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Steves Industries, Inc., 328 F.2d 505
(5th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Byrne & Co. v. Fire Assoc., 260 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir. 1958); United States ex rel. Tom P. McDermott v. Woods Constr. Co., 224 F. Supp.
406 (N.D. Okla. 1963).
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guidelines. The question is one of fact and degree. Even though items
are not consumed during the performance of the work, the supplier can
recover if there is no attempt by the contractor, within the actual or
constructive knowledge of the supplier, to build up his capital equip-
ment at the expense of the surety.28 If a repair part substantially in-
creases the value of machinery29 or has a useful life far in excess of the
duration of the present job, its cost is not recoverable;" or, on the other
hand, the cost of repairs done after the completion of a job normally
has not been allowed,3' on the premise that the repairs only make the
machinery available for use on other work.
The courts to date have not attempted to apply depreciation or other
cost allocation principles to the problem. Cost of particular items have
either been allowed or disallowed in toto rather than apportioned ac-
cording to the percentage of the useful life of the item expended during
the project. It could be urged, however, that an allowance of part of
the total cost is reasonable and proper where a significant proportion
of the economic life of an item will be used on the job, but where such
use does not amount to "substantial consumption" so as to permit a
recovery of the entire cost.
Rental Equipment,
The fair rental value of equipment used on the project is covered by
the Miller Act payment bond. If the rental is for an extended period,
the lessor may recover against the bond, even though the equipment
may be idle at times during the period of the lease.83 Where the lessee
28. United States ex rel. J. P. Byrne & Co. v. Fire Assoc., 260 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1958).
29. Boyd Callan v. United States ex reL Steves Industries, 328 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.
1964).
30. See United States ex rel. J. P. Byrne & Co. v. Fire Assoc, 260 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1958); United States ex rel Wyatt & Kipper Eng'rs v. Ramstad Constr. Co., 194 F.
Supp. 379 (D. Alas. 1961).
31. Continental Casualty Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 140 F.2d 115 (10th Cit. 1944);
United States ex rel. Miller & Bentley Equipment Co. v. Kelley, 192 F. Supp. 274 (D.
Alas. 1961); American Surety Co. v. Lawrenceville Cement Co., 110 F. 717 (D. Me.
1901).
32. See Friebel and Hartman, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Codel Constr. Co., 238 F.2d
394 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam); Basich Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel.
Turner, 159 F.2d 182 (9th Cit. 1946); United States ax rel. P. A. Bourguin & Co. v.
Chester Constr. Co., 104 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1939).
33. Friebel and Hartman, Inc. v. United States ax rel. Codel Constr. Co. 238 F.2d
394 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
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contracts to pay for loss of the equipment or damages in excess of
ordinary wear and tear and fails to do so, the lessor is covered; 34 and the
cost of furnishing repair parts to equipment under the lease for use on
the project is recoverable if not determined to be a capital expenditure."
If, however, part or all of the "rental" is in fact an installment pay-
ment for purchase of the equipment, such portion of the payment as
exceeds fair rental value is not recoverable.3
Fringe Benefits
All labor costs agreed to be paid on account of the work performed
on the job are covered, including fringe benefits. In one Supreme Court
case, amounts payable under a collective bargaining agreement to trustees
of a union benefit fund were held to be covered by the bond, the actual
laborers being beneficial owners of the fund.37
Freight and Demurrage
A railroad carrying material to the job site has been held to have
furnished labor within the meaning of the Act,3 and freight and demur-
rage charges on shipments have also been allowed.39 As in the case of
material, some element of reliance by those providing labor should be
required in order to narrow the range of claims.
Use "In the Prosecution of the Work"
If work is defective due to fault of the subcontractor, the subcontrac-
34. Moran Towing Corp. v. M. A. Gammino Constr. Co., 363 F.2d 108 (lst Cir.
1966); United States ex rel. Llewellyn Mach. Corp. v. National Surety Corp., 268 F.2d
610 (5th Cir. 1959).See Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 1243 (1959).
35. United States ex rel. Wyatt & Kipper Engineers, Inc. v. Ramstad Corp., 194
F. Supp. 379 (D. Alas. 1961).
36. Union Pacific Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Mississippi Valley Equipment Co.,
296 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1961); Continental Casualty Co. v. Clarence L. Boyd Co., 140
F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. Miller & Bentley Equipment Co. v.
Kelley, 192 F. Supp. 274 (D. Alas. 1961).
37. United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957).
38. Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. United States ex rel. Powell, 302 U.S. 442
(1938). See also United States ex rel. Benkart Co. v. John A. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 236
F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Wyatt & Kipper Engineer, Inc. v. Ramstad
Constr. Co., 194 F. Supp. 379 (D. Alas. 1961).
39. United States ex rel. Chemetron Corp. v. George A. Fuller Co., 250 F. Supp.
649 (D. Mont. 1966).
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tor may not recover for it under the bond.40 However, a subcontractor
is not a guarantor of the specifications and may recover where defects
are of design and not of construction.4 On the other hand, it has been
held that where a subcontractor performs work contrary to the require-
ments of his subcontract, he may nevertheless recover against the bond
if the work is in accord with prime contract plans and specifications. 42
However, the subcontractor can rely on his subcontract, notwithstand-
ing that it calls for work which is in fact at variance with that required
by the prime contract. Thus, a subcontractor cannot be "back charged"
for expenses borne by the prime contractor in correcting work to meet
Government specifications when the subcontractor had performed the
work according to the terms of the subcontract.43
The subcontractor may recover for extra work and the expense of
delays caused by the fault of the prime contractor.4 But where the
subcontractor is on notice that there will be changes ordered by the
Government "within the general scope of the contract," he stands in
no better position than the prime contractor and will not be compen-
sated for delay and expense caused by such changes.4 5
Similarly, the subcontractor may recover for work if it is requested
to be done by the prime contractor and done in good faith, whether
or not the prime contractor is ultimately compensated for it.4 6 For
example, where work is an "extra" under the subcontract but not so
under the prime contract: "All that is required is proof that the labor
or material was furnished in the prosecution of the work provided for
in the prime contract, and that the subcontractor has not been paid
therefor." 47
40. See United States ex rel Lichter v. Henke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13 (8th Cir.
1946); Robinson v. United States, 251 F. 461 (2d Cir. 1918) (where subcontractor could
not recover for work rejected by owner).
41. United States ex rel. Ardmore Concrete Material Co. v. Williams, 240 F.2d 561
(10th Cir. 1957).
42. H. B. Zachry Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 262 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1966)
(where prime contractor specified materials which were not authorized by the terms
of the prime contract).
43. United States ex rel. B's Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Co., 373 F.2d 585 (4th Cit. 1967).
44. Macri v. United States ex rel. Maxwell & Co., 353 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1965).
45. McDaniel v. Ashton-Mardian Co., 357 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1966).
46. See United States ex reL Warren Painting Co. v. Boespflug Constr. Co., 325 F.2d
54 (9th Cir. 1963); Macri & Sons v. United States ex rel. Oaks Constr. Co., 313 F.2d
119 (9th Cir. 1963).
47. United States ex rel. Warren Painting Co. v. Boespflug Constr. Co., 325 F.2d
54, 62 (9th Cit. 1963).
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If materials indispensable to the work are furnished to a subcontractor
with the good faith expectation that they will be used in the prosecu-
tion of the work, the supplier will not be precluded from recovering
on the bond merely because they are not in fact so used.48 This is true
even if the subcontractor diverts the material to another job or to his
own use,4 9 and the principle extends even to materials that are not deliv-
ered directly to the job site. 0 The burden of insuring that subcontrac-
tors use materials for their intended purposes is not upon the supplier,
but upon the prime contractor.5 ' However, if a supplier knows that
the subcontractor has many jobs in progress and delivers into a mingled
inventory, he may recover only for the materials actually used in the
job, 2 presumably because the element of reliance is not present in such
a case.
It has not been required that materials be physically installed or in-
corporated into the project in order to entitle their supplier to compen-
sation under the bond. 3 Because of this, the supplier of tires, tubes and
oil for earth moving equipment on a highway project is covered by the
bond.r4 In fact, the material furnished may be in no condition to be
used at all. Material damage in transit was the basis for a recovery by
the supplier where the purchasing subcontractor had assumed the risk
of loss in shipment.5
Measure of Recovery
The terms of an express contract or accepted purchase order cus-
tomarily prescribes the amount of compensation. In the absence of a
stated price or where there is only part performance not due to the
fault of the subcontractor or supplier, recovery under the quantum
meruit doctrine is normally allowed. However, it has been held that
48. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Tayler Products Corp., 351
F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
49. Glassel-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1946); see
also Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. United States ex reL Crane Co., 213 F.2d 106
(loth Cir. 1954).
50. Montgomery v. Unity Electric Co., 155 F. Supp. 179 (D. Puerto Rico 1957).
51. Glassel-Taylor Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 153 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1946).
52. United States ex rel. Chemetron Corp. v. Geo. A. Fuller, 250 F. Supp. 649 (D.
Mont. 1966).
53. Continental Casualty Co. v. Allsop Lumber Co., 336 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1964).
54. United States ex rel. Tom P. McDermott, Inc. v. Woods Constr. Co., 224 F. Supp.
406 (N.D. Okla. 1963).
55. United States ex rel. National U.S. Radiator Corp. v. D. C. Loveys Co., 174 F.
Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1959), aff'd 275 F.2d 372 (1st Cir. 1960).
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it must be possible to infer an actual contract from all the facts and
circumstances since a "quasi-contractual obligation to prevent unjust
enrichment is not included within the scope of implied contracts as the
term is used in the Miller Act." ;1
A substantial agreement on price under an express contract, even
though there was a failure to agree on minor items, will not force a
claimant to resort to quantum meruit as to all the work performed.
Thus, failure to agree on one $9,300 item did not prevent recovery on
the express contract for approximately $1,000,000 of other work.5 7
A subcontractor can recover for partial performance at the contracted
price, or under the doctrine of quantum meruit, if the prime contractor
"caccepts" part performance,"' or where full performance is prevented
through no fault of the subcontractor.59
CLAIMANTS UNDER MILLER ACT PAYMENT BoNDS
Although Sec. 1 (a) (2) of the Miller Act requires a payment bond
"for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material in the
prosecution of the work," Sec. 2 (a) 6 0 states that:
Every person who has furnished labor or material .. shall have
the right to sue on such payment bond... : Provided, however,
That any person having direct contractual relationship with a sub-
contractor but no contractual relationship express or implied
with the contractor furnishing said payment bond shall have a
right of action upon the said payment bond upon giving written
notice to said contractor within ninety days....
In MacEvoy v. United States,6' the Supreme Court held that the lan-
guage of the proviso constituted "plain words of limitation," making it
clear that:
the right to bring suit on a payment bond is limited to (1) those
materialmen, laborers and subcontractors who deal directly with
56. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Harris, 360 F.2d 402, 410 (9th Cir. 1966); Note,
35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 124 (1966).
57. Purvis v. United States ex rel. Assoc. Sand & Gravel Co., 344 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.
1965).
58. IM. Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376 (1917); American Surety Co. of
N.Y. v. United States ex rel. B & B Drilling Co., 368 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1966).
59. See Premier Roof Co. v. United States ex rel. Alpaca Electric Corp., 315 F.2d 18
(9th Cir. 1963); Narragansett Imp. Co. v. United States ex reL. Mello, 290 F.2d 577
(1st Cir. 1961).
60. 40 U.S.C.A. 270b(a) (1958).
61. 322 U.S. 102 (1944).
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the prime contractor and (2) those materialmen, laborers and sub-
contractors who, lacking express or implied contractual relation-
ship with the prime contractor, have direct contractual relation-
ship with the subcontractor and who give the statutory notice of
their claims to the prime contractor .. .
Extent of Bond Coverage Under Miller Act
Payment Bond
Notice Requirements
Prime Contractor
1st Tier Sub e Materialman
(No Notice necessary) (No Notice necessary)
End of Bond Coverage
2nd Tier Sub Materialman
(Notice required) (Notice required)
End of Bond Coverage
Thus, a first tier subcontractor or supplier (materialman) of the
prime contractor may bring suit without giving notice. A supplier of
a subcontractor, or a sub-subcontractor (second tier) may bring suit,
but only if proper notice has been given. Finally, a supplier of a sup-
plier, and a supplier of a sub-subcontractor cannot maintain a claim
even by giving notice, because they lack the required direct relationship
with the contractor or a first tier subcontractor.
In setting these limitations, the Court in MacEvoy said that in the
absence of express statutory language, Congress could not have intended
to impose liability on the prime contractor in situations where it is dif-
ficult or impossible for him to protect himself.0 The prime contractor
who has paid a subcontractor for work, may nevertheless be liable to
pay for the second time to unpaid second tier subcontractors or sup-
62. Id. at 107.
63. Id. at 110.
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pliers. Thus, under MacEvoy, even though the prime contractor must
be responsible for the subcontractor's failure to pay, the prime con-
tractor cannot reasonably be required to make good a similar failure
of a sub-subcontractor or other remote person whom he has probably
not chosen for the job and may not even know exists.
It must also be noted that MacEvoy denies coverage to a person even
though he has direct contractual relationship with an immediate supplier
of the prime contractor. This difference between the treatment of
subcontractors and suppliers is also grounded in the fact that the sub-
contractors are relatively few and well known to the prime contractor,
whereas there may be a great number of suppliers, not so well known
to the prime contractor, who in the case of their business incur "remote
and undeterminable liabilities" which the prime contractor cannot be
expected to underwrite."
It is not surprising in light of the above that litigation in this area of
the Miller Act has usually be directed toward establishing that a party
is or is not entitled to the favored status of "subcontractor," as opposed
to either supplier or sub-subcontractor.
Subcontractor or Supplier
In MacEvoy, the Court held that the proper definition of subcontrac-
tor was that "established by usage in the building trades." '5 Under that
definition, a subcontractor is "one who performs for and takes from
the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements
of the original contract, thus excluding ordinary laborers and material-
men." "' The party for whom subcontractor status was being sought
in MacEvoy did not fit this definition and was held to be a mere sup-
plier. Subsequent cases have had to deal with and refine the principle
in greater depth.
The Tenth Circuit has rested the distinction on "the extent to which,
in matters of substance, the prime contractor delegates to the supplier
... a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the prime
contract." 67 A supplier of all of the concrete for a job was not held to
be a subcontractor. 68 Concrete being a standard product, the court dis-
64. Id. at 110.
65. Id. at 108-109.
66. Id. at 109.
67. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Lembke Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1966).
68. United States ex rel. Potomac Rigging Co. v. Wright Contracting Co., 194 F.
Supp. 444 (D. Md. 1961); contra, Basich Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Turner,
159 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1946).
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tinguished the case from others which have held that suppliers of "cus-
tomized" materials, unique and specially made for the job, are subcon-
tractors even though they do not perform installation services.6 9
'The distinction may also arise from the method of payment to the
punitive subcontractor. Thus, whether a person furnishing labor or
materials to the project is paid on the basis of an estimate, or is given
progress payments from which retainage is withheld, or receives pay-
ment for goods as delivered, or whether there is a sales tax added to.
his bill may all be factors in determining his status.70
It is also important to establish whether the prime contractor regarded
the party in question as a subcontractor or as a materialman. If a prime
contractor uses the "Standard Form of Material Contract" for some
persons and the "Standard Form of Subcontract" for others, this has
probative value.7' Where all subcontracts and subcontractors' payrolls
are normally submitted and approved in the course of its business by
the project owner, the fact that a given party did not have to submit to
such requirements will be a factor tending to show he is only a sup-
plier.7 2 The same will be true if a bond is required of other subcontrac-
tors and not of him.73
In a recent case,74 the Ninth Circuit was confronted with a party
that had two contracts with the prime contractor. One was clearly a
subcontract for the erection of a radar tower; the other was written on
a standard form contract for materials. Perhaps out of deference to the
"highly remedial" nature of the Miller Act, the court held that the
mere existence of two contracts "beclouds the issue" to such an extent
that it allowed recovery as to material supplied under both contracts.
69. See United States ex rel. Wellman Engineering Co. v. MST Corp., 350 F.2d
285 (2d Cir. 1965); Basich Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Turner, 159 F.2d
182 (9th Cir. 1946); United States ex rel. Hardwood Products Corp. v. John A.
Johnson & Sons, 137 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
70. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Lembke Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1966);
United States ex rel. Potomac Rigging Co. v. Wright Contracting Co., 194 F. Supp. 444
(D. Md. 1961).
71. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Lembke Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir.
1966).
72. United States ex rel. Potomac Rigging Co. v. Wright Contracting Co., 194 F.
Supp. 444,447 (D. Md. 1961).
73. United States ex rel. Bryant v. Lembke Constr. Co., 370 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1966).
74. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States ex rel. Western Steel Co., 362 F.2d
896 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Subcontractor or Sub-Subcontractor?
Occasionally, the courts have treated a technical sub-subcontractor as
a subcontractor, allowing persons who dealt with him to recover against
the bond.75 In one case, this was done because the sub was "one of the
relatively few subcontractors who perform part of the original contract,
and who accordingly represent in a sense the prime contractor and are
well known to him." 76 Courts have "looked through" the existence
of punitive subcontractors which they believe have been placed in the
contractual chain chiefly to insulate the prime contractor from liability
and have done no work themselves,77 or which are controlled by, or
commingle assets and personnel with, the prime contractor.78
Attempts to ignore a nominal subcontractor have not always met
with success, however. In one case, the fact that first and second tier
subcontractors were under substantially common control was not
enough to warrant disregarding their separate identities.7 9 The formation
of a joint venture between the prime contractor and his subcontractor,
after the issuance of the bond, was not enough to enable the plaintiff-
supplier, who had a contract with the subcontractor/joint-venturer, to
bring an action without giving notice.8 0 And in denying the right to a
supplier of a sub-subcontractor to recover, it being alleged that the
subcontractor was the alter ego of the prime contractor, the Ninth
Circuit has said that "there must be subterfuge, collusion or interposi-
75. For a general discussion, see irwan, Telescoping Tiers of Subcontractors in
Miller Act Cases: An Exception to the Rule in MacEvoy, 2 FORUM 173 (1967) (Sec.
of Ins. Negl. and Comp. Law).
76. McGregor Architectural Iron Co. v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 150 F. Supp.
323, 326 (D. Pa. 1957). See United States ex rel. West Pacific Sales Co. v. Harder
Industrial Contractors, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 699 (D. Oregon 1963), where the court and
AEC treated the prime contractor as mere supervising agent, with the construction sub-
contractor treated as a prime on his work; contra, Carruth v. Standard Accident In-
surance Co., 239 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1964) is questionable as a precedent since the
Court erroneously assumed (at 691) that the AEC cost-type prime contractor
furnished Miller Act bonds; see also Southern Industries, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
James Bond Trucking Co., 326 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1964), where corporate plaintiff was
permitted to sue in its own right as an undisclosed principal.
77. Bushman Constr. Co. v. Conner, 260 F. Supp. 779 (D. Colo. 1966).
78. United States ex rel. Way Panama, S.A. v. Uhlhorn International, SA., 238 F.
Supp. 887 (D. C.Z. 1965).
79. United States ex rel. Powers Regulator Co. v. Farina Constr. Corp., 261 F. Supp.
278 (D. Mass. 1966).
80. United States ex rel. A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. Anchor Contractors, Inc., 257
F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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tion of a strawman to warrant elimination of a party in a chain of
subcontracts." 81
In a case with a slightly different emphasis, the prime contractor had
formed a joint venture with one of the unsuccessful bidders on the same
job, calling him a "subcontractor." The court, on the other hand,
called him a "principal" and held that he could not maintain a Miller
Act suit for amounts alleged to be owed to him by his co-venturer. -
Assignees and Creditors
Assignees of persons who have furnished labor or material for the
job have consistently been allowed to recover under both the Heard and
Miller Acts. 3 Of course, an assignee does not gain any greater right
than his assignor had .4 Therefore, where a subcontractor has failed to
pay his supplier, the claim of the assignee of the rights of the subcon-
tractor has a lower priority against the fund created by the bond than do
the claims of the subcontractor's suppliers."5 Recovery has been al-
lowed even where there is only an equitable assignment. In one case,
where the creditor of a prime contractor had discharged the contractor's
obligation by paying wages to his employees, the creditor was allowed
recovery notwithstanding the absence of a formal assignment of the
employees' claims to him. The court held that the creditor's claim
"could be properly allowed on principles of subrogation." 8I However,
in another case where a contractor's employees were paid by checks
drawn by the contractor against insufficient funds, the bank had to
absorb the loss when the court held that by paying on the checks with-
out assuring that funds were available, the bank had in effect volun-
81. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Harris, 360 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1966).
82. United States ex rel. Briggs v. Grubb, 358 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1966).
83. Clifford E. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944); United States
ex rel. Jahn v. Jones Coal Co., 368 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel.
Wolther v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co., 173 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. N.Y. 1959).
See also United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, where a defendant
sought summary judgment contending that the plaintiff assignor, who had furnished
the labor and materials, was not the real party in interest under Rule 17(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court looked to state law and held that the
assignor retained a substantive right to enforce the claim and was a proper party
plaintiff; Bushman Constr. v. Conner, 260 F. Supp. 779 (D. Colo. 1966).
84. Peninsula State Bank v. Thompson-Copeland, Inc., 346 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1965).
85. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. First State Bank of
Denton, 217 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1954).
86. Continental Casualty Co. v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 134 F. Supp.
602, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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tarily made a loan to the contractor and was not entitled to subroga-
tion.
Granting the premise of a voluntary loan, the preceding case is in
accord with other holdings regarding the rights of creditors. The lend-
ing of money to the contractor does not constitute the furnishing of
"labor and/or materials" and is not covered under the Miller Act.8
PRESERVATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER
MILLER ACT PAYMENT BONDS
Despite the liberality with which the Miller Act has been interpreted
in favor of recovery, claimants must comply strictly with the require-
ments as to notice and time for bringing suit. These requirements are: 8 9
(1) That suit cannot be brought less than ninety days nor more than
one year after the last of the labor or material was furnished by the
claimant; and
(2) That, unless a claimant has a contractual relationship, express or
implied, with the prime contractor furnishing the payment bond, he
must give notice of his claim to the prime contractor within ninety
days after the last of the labor or material was furnished by him.
Moreover, in at least one case, the prime contractor has been allowed
to assert the defense of estoppel against an otherwise valid and timely
claim. The supplier of a subcontractor had agreed to notify the prime
contractor if prompt payments were not made by the sub, and the prime
contractor continued to make progress payments to the sub in reliance
on the supplier's silence. It was held that the supplier could not later
recover under the bond, since, if supplier had done what it agreed to
do, the prime would have made its payments directly to the supplier and
the problem would have been avoided.90
Time for Bringing Suit
The date from which the time for bringing suit is measured, is "the
day on which the last of the labor was performed or material was sup-
87. United States ex rel. First Continental Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Western Con-
tracting Corp., 341 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1965).
88. Hardaway v. Nat'l Surety Co., 211 U.S. 552 (1909), Bill Curphy Co. v. Eliot,
207 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Dorfman v. Standard Surety & Cas.
Co., 37 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
89. 40 U.S.C. § 270b (1958).
90. United States ex reL Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. James Stewart Co., 336
F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1964).
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plied" by the dlaimant. Prior to the 1959 amendment,91 time ran from
the "date of final settlement" of the contract under which the claim was
being made, as certified by the Comptroller General. The present pro-
vision was adopted "to eliminate all responsibility of the government
for fixing dates on which the period for filing suits .. .commences to
run." 92
Unless suit is brought within the year, the rights under the bond lapse.
Suit within the one-year period is a "condition precedent" to recovery
and the one year provision cannot be waived.'
The provision that suit cannot be brought prior to ninety days after
the last work was furnished has never presented a serious problem.
Even if suit is prematurely filed, the defect can be corrected by sup-
plemental pleadings. 4 Where a complaint was filed less than ninety
days from the last work date and followed by a supplemental complaint
filed more than a year later, it was held that the later complaint related
back so as to save the suit from the one year limitation, but that it did
not relate back to the date of the first complaint so as to make the action
premature; and on this basis, the suit was allowed.95
Ninety Day Notice"0
If he has a contractual relationship with the prime contractor, the
claimant need not give notice. As noted above, the right to sue of any-
one not having a direct contractual relationship: with the prime con-
tractor is conditioned on his giving written notice to the prime con-
tractor within ninety days after the date on which the claimant "did or
performed the last of the labor or furnished or supplied th6 last of the
91. Act of August 4, 1959, Pub. L. 86-135, 5 1, 73 Star. 279.
92. United States ex rel. Dover Elevator Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America; 339
F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1964); See S. REP. No. 551, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
93. Fleischer Engineering & Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Geo, S. Hallenbeck,
311 U.S. 15, 19 (1940); United States ex rel. Weitham v. Buckley Union Casualty Co.,
207 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ohio 1962); United States v. Seaboard Surety Co., 201 F. Supp.
630 (N.D. Tex. 1961); M. A. Hartlett, Inc. v. Enterprise Engineering & Constr. Co, 169
F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1958).
94. United States ex rel. C. W. Atkins v. Reiten & Stewart Constr. Co., 313 F2d 673
(9th Cir. 1963); see also Harry F. Ortlip Co. of Pa. v. Alvey Ferguson Co., 223 F. Supp.
893 (ED. Pa. 1963).
95. Security Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Haydis, 338 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1964).
96. For a general discussion see Cassemi, The Miller Act-Subcontractor's Material-
man Sufficiency of Notice-Remedy Where Notice is Sufficient, 24 INs. CsL J., 230
(1957); Elgin, Notice Requirements of the Miller Act, 27 INs. CsL. J. 66 (1960); Hurne,
The Notice Provision of the Miller Act, 31 INs. CSL. J. 275 (1964).
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material" for which claim is made. Time is computed according to
Rule 6 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
A further provision of the statute is that notice be given by registered
mail; however, this is not required where actual receipt is shown.98 The
intent of the registered mail provision is "not to make the described
method mandatory so as to deny right of suit when the required written
notice within the specified time had actually been given and received.
In the face of such receipt, the reason for a particular mode of service
fails." I" But where the notice is not sent by registered mail, the burden
of proving receipt is on the plaintiff and the notice is not considered
given unless actually received. 100 On the other hand, if registered mail
is used, notice is considered given when mailed. 1' 1
The notice must "state 'with substantial accuracy' the amount claimed
and the name of the party to whom the material was furnished or sup-
plied or for whom the labor was done or performed" and must present
an affirmative claim requesting payment of the sums due.1' It must
"inform the prime contractor, expressly or by implication, that the
supplier is looking to the contractor for payment of the subcontractor's
bill." 103 Communications that fail even to intimate or suggest that any
claim is being asserted, are insufficient. A mere request by a subcon-
tractor for consent of the prime contractor to an assignment to a
materialman of monies due the subcontractor has been held not to pre-
serve the claim of the materialman. 0 4 But an oral claim later acknowl-
edged by a letter from the prime contractor was held sufficient, since
"it plainly appears that the nature and state of the indebtedness was
brought home to the general contractor." '05 Thus, substance rather
than form will determine the sufficiency of notice.
97. United States ex rel. Lakeman Elec. Products Corp. v. Greene Electrical Service
252 F. Supp. 324 (ED. N.Y. 1966).
98. Fleisher Engineering and Constr. Co. v. United States, 311 U. S. 15 (1940).
99. Id. at 19.
100. United States ex "tel Twin County Transit Mix, Inc. v. R. P. McTeague Constr.
Co., 264 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
101. United States ex rel. Lincoln Electric Products Co. v. Green Electrical Service,
252 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); United States ex rel. Crowe v. Continental Casualty
Co., 245 F. Supp. 871 (ED. La. 1965).
102. United States ex rel. J. A. Edwards & Co. v. Thompson Constr. Corp., 273
F.2d 873, 874 (2d Cir. 1959).
103. United States ex rel. Joyce v. F. A. Bachner, Inc., 326 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1964).
104. United States ex rel. J. A. Edwards & Co. v. Thompson Constr. Corp, 273
F. 2d 873, 876-877 (2d. Cir. 1959).
105. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Trane Co., 217 F.2d
727, 730 (Sth Cir. 1954).
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Date Last Labor or Material Was Furnished
Both the time for giving notice and that for bringing suit run from
the time at which the claimant furnished the last labor or material to
the job. It should be noted that time starts to run from the date of the
last labor or material furnished "for which such claim is made" and the
fact that subsequent work was done for which claim is not being made
does not prevent time from starting to run. 0 6
Where materials are provided over a long period of time, the question
arises whether they were provided under separate contracts, in which
case notice must be given within ninety days of the last work under
each contract, 0 7 or whether there is a single continuing contract where
a single notification at the end of the period covers all the work.'
The existence of many separate and seemingly unrelated purchase orders
indicates that there is no single continuing contract, and this may be
true even where credit is extended on open account.109 The outcome
will depend on the precise facts of each case, and a single notification
within ninety days after the last work was furnished under various
separate purchase orders on a C.O.D. basis, has been held to be sufficient
as to all the work, even though the bulk of it was done more than
ninety days before notice was given.""
As to the time when labor or material is considered "furnished," this
has been held to be the time it reaches the hands of the person to whom
supplied.' Where a sub-subcontractor left materials on the job which
much later were installed by the subcontractor who back-charged the
sub-subcontractor for the labor costs of installation, time was held to
run from the date of installation." 2
Punch list items are a problem. It has been held that a return to the
site for correction of defective work, or furnishing or replacement parts,
does not start the period running anew, since a succession of such re-
106. United States ex rel. McGrath v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 253 F. Supp. 330
(D. Ariz. 1966).
107. United States v. Peter Reiss Constr. Co., 273 F.2d 880, 881 (2d Cir. 1959).
108. Noland Co. v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 273 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1959).
109. Noland Co. v. Allied Constractors, 273 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Peter Reiss Constr. Co., 273 F.2d 880, 881 (2d Cir. 1959).
110. United States ex rel. Chemetron Corp. v. Geo. A. Fuller Co., 250 F. Supp. 649
(D. Mont. 1966).
111. United States ex rel. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., Inc. v. Endebrock-
White Co., Inc., 275 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1960).
112. United States ex rel. P. A. Bourquin & Co., Inc. v. Chester Constr. Co, 104 F.2d
648 (2d Cir. 1939).
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turns might keep the time running indefinitely and enable a subcon-
tractor to benefit from his own fault."3 Where replacement fixtures
were provided more than ninety days after the bulk of the labor and
material had been -furnished, claimant's belief that replacement fixtures
were part of this contract was held to be of no consequence since he
let the full notice period pass without any assurance that he would ever
have to go back to the job. It was plain that he had let his Miller Act
rights lapse.'
On the other hand, it has been held that time runs from the furnishing
of the last labor or material, and not from such earlier time as when
there might have been "substantial performance," so that a delay in
order to make finishing touches, if the work is called for by the con-
tract, prevents time from beginning to run."5 Material which was not
to be incorporated into the job but was used only to install other mate-
rial has been considered as "material furnished" which kept the notice
period from beginning to run."16
Where rental equipment was furnished and remained on the job site
during the agreed period of the lease but after the subcontract of the
lessee was terminated, one court, stating that the notice period normally
runs from the last date on which rental equipment was available for
use on the project, held that it was not "available" after termination of
the subcontract and that notice more than ninety days after the ter-
mination was not sufficient.l7
In a novel Fifth Circuit case, a subcontractor had been continuously
in arrears in paying for paint furnished him by the claimant supplier.
The court found that in clearing arrearages, the subcontractor had the
right to determine against which shipments of paint his partial payments
on account were to be applied; that they were in fact applied against
current shipments; and therefore, that the paint for which payment had
not yet been received was supplied more than ninety days prior to
113. See United States ex rel. McGregor Architectural Iron Co. v. Merritt-Chapman
& Scott Corp., 185 F. Supp. 381 (D. Pa. 1960).
114. United States, ex rel. General Elec. Co. v. H. I. Lewis Constr. Co., 375 F.2d
194 (2d Cir. 1967).
115. United States ex rel. Austin v. Western Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
116. United States ex rel. Betts v. Continental Casualty Co., 230 F. Supp. 557 (W).
Pa. 1964).
117. United States ex rel. Taykinswell v. Bencon Constr. Co., 248 F. Supp. 502 (D.
Md. 1965), aff'd 369 F.2d 405 (1966); United States ex rel. Miller & Bentley Equipment
Co. v. Kelley, 192 F. Supp. 274 (D. Alas. 1961).
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notice being given."' The result, a failure to recover for the bulk of
the paint supplied, was roughly the same as would have occurred if
the various shipments had been treated as separate contracts.
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND CONFLICT OF LAW PROBLEMS
Sec. 2(b) of the Miller Act provides that payment bond suits "shall
be brought ... in the United States District Court for any district in
which the contract was to be performed and executed and not else-
where, irrespective of the amount in controversy in each suit. .. "
(Suit upon a bond which was required on an overseas job may be
brought in any U.S. District Court.)'"
That jurisdictional language has been called "unequivocal in its grant
of exclusive jurisdiction over suits on Miller Act bonds in the Federal
Courts..." 120 Such exclusivity is illustrated by an Eighth Circuit case
which had been removed from state to federal court. Since the removal
gave only derivative jurisdiction to the federal court, depending upon
the prior jurisdiction of the state court, it was held that the federal court
had no jurisdiction even though it would have had it if the action had
been originated there. 12'
Where claims involved both federal jurisdiction and state, a federal
court may take jurisdiction over the entire matter if the claims are such
as would normally be tried in one proceeding.122
State law cannot "condition the rights granted under the Miller Act,"
and in a case where state law would have rendered a subcontract void
because of the failure of the claimant to qualify to do business in the
state, it was held that state law did not apply and the party was allowed
to bring suit under the Miller Act.s
The provision requiring suit to be brought in the district in which
the contract was to be performed is considered a venue provision and
is not prerequisite to jurisdiction. 2  Thus, where the contract was to
118. S. S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. Lambert Corp., 371 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1967).
119. United States ex rel. Bryant Electric Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 297
F. 2d 665 (2d Cir. 1962); Note, 76 HARV. L. REv. 635 (1963).
120. Id.
121. Koppers Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 337 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1964).
122. United States ex reL Mandel Bros. Contracting Corp. v. P. J. Carlin Constr.
Co., 254 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. N.Y. 1966).
123. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. R. J. Struder & Sons, 365
F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1966).
124. United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc.,
364 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1966).
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be performed in Wyoming and suit was brought in Montana* the court
in Montana assumed jurisdiction and transferred the suit to Wyoming,
rather than dismiss it.125
The venue provision was inserted for the benefit of claimants; thus,
an agreement imposed by a prime contractor in which the subcontractor
agreed to sue only in the District of Columbia, while the contract was
to be performed elsewhere, was held void.120  Likewise, a provision of
the subcontract requiring all disputes to be taken to court only in New
York state courts is not effective to oust federal courts of their jurisdic-
tion.1 7
Where the question has arisen whether state or federal law should
govern the substantial rights of the parties in Miller Act suits, it has
usually been held that the court is free from the restraints of Erie v.
Tompkins and need not follow state precedents in contract- actions. 28
Some courts, however, have taken a contrary position, one court stating
that while "the action is brought under a federal statute, it is in the nature
of an action on a contract and the construction of the federal statute
is not involved." 129 In another case, the amount of recovery in quan-
turn meruit was determined under state law.130
State law governs the right of a party to a Miller Act suit to recover
amounts ancillary to the main claim, such as pre-judgment interest,11
attorneys' fees 3 2 and costs. 133
125. United States ex rel. Angell Bros., Inc. v. Cave Constr., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 873
(D. Mont. 1966).
126. United States ex rel. Vermont Marble Co. v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr.. Co., 246
F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1965). If the case had been dismissed, the action, would have
been barred, since the time for bringing suit had expired.
127. United States ex rel. Ray Cains, Inc. v. Essential Constr. Co., 261 F. Supp. 715
(D. Md. 1966).
128. Liebman v. United States ex rel. California Elec. Supply Co., 153-F.2d 350 (9th
Cir. 1946); R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co, 112 F.2d 150..(5th Cir.
1940).
129. United States ex rel. Lichter v. Hencke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13, 24 (8th Cir.
1946).
130. Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will, 304 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1962).
131. I11. Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U.S. 376 (1917); United States ex rel.
Peevy v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 257 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Ark. 1966).
132. United States ex rel. Hendry Corp. v. Smith Engineering and Constr- Co., 240
F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Fla. 1965). See Hume, What Law Determines Liability of a Miller
Act Surety for Attorney's Fees? 32 INs. CSL. J. 134 (1965).
133. Baker & Ford Co. v. United States ex rel. Urban Plumbing & Heating Co., 363
F2d 605 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Arbitration134
A contractual agreement that the parties to a construction contract
will arbitrate their differences will be enforced, even in a Miller Act
situation, to the extent that judicial proceedings may be stayed pending
the outcome of arbitration. 135 Apparently one court has gone farther
by enforcing an arbitration provision as a substitute for the judicial
remedy. 3 Where proceedings are merely stayed, a claimant may sub-
mit to arbitration, meanwhile protecting itself against the running of the
one year limitation by filing a protective suit. Once the arbitration
award was made, the claimant would have the right to come into court
again, perhaps amending its complaint in light of the award.3 7 The
enforcement of arbitration provisions will be permitted even if the ar-
bitration is conducted outside the district in which venue is laid." s
Consents by potential claimants to extra-judicial settlement of disputes
apparently are strictly construed. Thus, in a Ninth Circuit case of sig-
nificant import, it was held that the standard "disputes" clause in the
prime contract, under which the prime contractor agreed to submit all
questions of fact under the contract to the contracting officer and the
head of the department, did not in any way bind subcontractors and
materialmen.'"
Procedure
Consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Miller Act in favor of
claimants, technical defects in pleadings have often been overlooked.
For example, it was held that if the jurisdictional requirements for a
Miller Act suit are in fact present, a complaint will not be dismissed
for its failure either to specifically refer to the Miller Act or to name
the United States as a party (the interest of the United States being
134. See generally Hume, Contract Provisions Requiring Arbitration of Miller Act
Claims, 30 INs. CSL. J. 107 (1963); Reeves, The Application of the United States Arbi-
tration Act to Miller Act Suits, 50 VA. L. R-v. 105 (1964).
135. United States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missiles, Inc., 364
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1966).
136. Electronics & Missiles Facilities, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Moseley, 306 F.2d
554 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
137. United States cx rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missiles Facilities, Inc.,
364 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Ray Gains, Inc. v. Essential Constr.
Co., 261 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1966).
138. United States ex rel. Industrial Engineering & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Eric
Elevator Corp., 214 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1963).
139. Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will, 304 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1962).
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merely nominal) and that both of these defects may be corrected by
supplemental pleadings.1 0 In addition, the surety of a prime contractor
may be sued alone without joining the prime contractor.',-
SUMMARY
The Miller Act and its payment bond do afford substantial guarantees
generally to supplier, subcontractors and other persons furnishing mate-
rials or labor on most government construction projects; but, like the
mechanics liens for which they are a substitute, they require timely
action and there are important limitations on coverage. Persons dealing
with prime contractors or others on a government construction job in
reliance upon the guarantee of the payment bond should ensure that
they are covered from the outset, and must diligently pursue their rights
in the event that a claim arises.
140. Blanchard v. Terry & Wright, 331 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1964).
141. United States ex rel. Hudson v. Peerless Ins. Co, 374 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1967).
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